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INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s daily tweets attacking the media have led
many observers to express concern about the state of the press in
our nation. Trump has called the press “the ... enemy of the [Amer-
ican] people,”1 encouraged a climate of hatred toward journalists at
his rallies,2 refused to condemn Saudi Arabia for the brutal killing
of reporter Jamal Khashoggi,3 and accused the media of writing
“fake news.”4 The public’s trust in the institutional press has
simultaneously diminished.5 Combined with the continuing eco-
nomic challenges journalists face, the press is certainly facing some
difficult times.
1. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 20, 2019, 4:20 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1130433207487336450 [https://perma.cc/QAM6-
ASQW] (“The Mainstream Media has never been as corrupt and deranged as it is today.
FAKE NEWS is actually the biggest story of all and is the true ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE!
That’s why they refuse to cover the REAL Russia Hoax. But the American people are wise to
what is going on.”).
2. Pete Vernon, A Climate of Hate Toward the Press at Trump Rallies, COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REV. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/trump-acosta-rally.php
[https://perma.cc/T7U9-H5TF]. Reporters have been assaulted at Trump rallies. See, e.g., Man
Arrested for Assaulting Reporter Outside of Trump’s Reelection Announcement Rally, U.S.
PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (June 20, 2019), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/man-
arrested-for-assaulting-reporter-outside-of-trumps-reelection-announcement-rally/ [https://
perma.cc/876E-M7TS]. President Trump’s Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, has said
that Trump does not support violence against journalists but that it is a “two-way street.” See
Press Briefing by Sarah Sanders, White House Press Sec’y (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.white
house.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-080118/ [https://
perma.cc/UU5B-95P9] (“We certainly support a free press. We certainly condemn violence
against anybody. But we also ask that people act responsibly and report accurately and
fairly.”).
3. See, e.g., Jason Lemon, Trump Defends Saudi Arabia’s Murder of Journalist Jamal
Khashoggi by Saying Iran Kills People, Too, NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2019, 3:17 PM), https://
www.newsweek.com/trump-defends-saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi-iran-kills-people-1445430
[https://perma.cc/DLE4-VCPK].
4. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 8, 2019, 4:25 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1137500852778864645 [https://perma.cc/5PMM-
V3F4] (“Watched MSNBC this morning just to see what the opposition was saying about
events of the past week. Such lies, almost everything they were saying was the opposite of the
truth. Fake News! No wonder their ratings, along with CNN, are WAY DOWN. The hatred
Comcast has is amazing!”).
5. Matthew Ingram, Most Americans Say They Have Lost Trust in the Media, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/trust-in-media-down.
php [https://perma.cc/V9PP-K93K].
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Nevertheless, things are not as dire as they seem, and it is
because the courts have continued to embrace the largely press-
protective interpretation of the First Amendment that arose in
another time of crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan6 and New York Times Co. v. United States7 (Pentagon
Papers), the Supreme Court provided meaningful protection for the
press in a time of great crisis and doctrinal uncertainty. Occurring
during the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, respec-
tively, these cases represent the high point of constitutional
protection for the press. These landmark decisions continue to
provide meaningful protection for the press today. In both of these
cases, the press faced fundamental threats to its role in checking
government power and informing our democracy, and in both of
these high-stakes cases, the press emerged victorious.8
Over time, however, these decisions have provided less protection
than they may have initially appeared to provide. In the case of
Sullivan, the scope of this protection has been narrowed,9 while the
prosecution of Julian Assange threatens to unravel the state of
“benign indeterminancy”10 that resulted from the Pentagon Papers
opinion.11 Although the news from the courts these days is still
largely good for the press, we should be cautious about expecting the
courts to be the press’s savior. Specifically, the courts have not
aggressively protected the rights of journalists to gather informa-
tion;12 in addition, court decisions favorable to the press appear to
do very little to stem the public’s growing mistrust of the media.13
6. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964) (holding public officials asserting defamation claims
must demonstrate the defendant published the challenged statements with “actual malice”).
7. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a prior restraint
prohibiting the publication of secret history of United States involvement in the Vietnam
War).
8. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292.
9. See Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (refusing to extend “privilege
to defamation of private individuals”).
10. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1973).
11. See infra notes 119-23.
12. See, e.g., Editorial, The Uninhibited Press, 50 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/opinion/sunday/the-uninhibited-press-50-years-later.
html [https://perma.cc/Z9Z5-MM26] (discussing how the Obama administration tried “ag-
gressively shutting down avenues of inquiry”).
13. See Ingram, supra note 5.
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It is also far from certain that today’s Supreme Court would be as
sympathetic to the role of the press as the Court was in the 1960s
and early 1970s.
Part I will discuss defamation law with a focus on the Court’s
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. This decision “con-
stitutionalized” the common law tort of defamation and dealt a
death blow to a series of lawsuits by southern government officials
aimed at silencing the publication.14 The decision has since provided
an essential foundation for press freedom for over fifty years.15 At
the same time, because the decision did not grant the press (or the
public generally) absolute immunity for the publication of defama-
tory information about matters of public concern,16 speakers
potentially face years of distracting and expensive litigation, even
if they ultimately prevail.
Part II turns to protections for the publication of national security
secrets. In United States v. New York Times Co. (Pentagon Papers),
the Court held that the executive branch could not prevent the press
from publishing a damning study of the United States’s involvement
in the Vietnam War.17 But this decision does not provide immunity
for defamation or the publication or collection of national security
secrets and leaves journalists—as well as their sources—exposed to
civil and criminal liability.
Part III examines the Court’s failure to recognize constitutional
protection for newsgathering activities. Although the Court has held
that the First Amendment provides a broad right of access to
criminal proceedings,18 this right belongs to the public and not the
press. Furthermore, this decision stands as something of an
anomaly in the Court’s right of access jurisprudence. One rea-
son—although not the only one—for the Court’s reluctance to
recognize a more extensive right of access is its unwillingness to
give the right to the entire public as well as its inability to define
14. See GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 229-55 (2006) (discussing the lawsuits against
the New York Times in the South).
15. See Editorial, supra note 12.
16. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).
17. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding the
First Amendment provided a public right of access to criminal trials).
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the “press” in a meaningful way. With the enormous changes in our
media environment in the last two decades,19 it seems highly
unlikely that the Court will use the Press Clause to provide ex-
pansive rights of access.
Despite all of President Trump’s attacks and the public’s growing
distrust of the press, the fourth branch continues to play an
important role in checking government power and informing our
democracy. It is less clear, however, whether the press will be able
to continue to rely on the courts to provide these constitutional
protections for this important work.
I. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN AND DEFAMATION LAW
In May 2016, the New York Times published a front-page article
revealing that then-presidential candidate Donald Trump had
sexually assaulted several women.20 Trump denied these allega-
tions, and his lawyer sent the Times a letter asking the newspaper
to remove the article from its website and apologize, and threaten-
ing to file a defamation lawsuit.21 New York Times’s Associate
General Counsel David McCraw wrote a feisty letter in response
that not only defended the accuracy of the story but also made clear
that the newspaper had a public duty to publish it, saying, “It would
have been a disservice not just to our readers but to democracy itself
to silence their voices.”22 He concluded that if Donald Trump
disagrees and “believes that American citizens had no right to hear
what these women had to say and that the law of this country forces
us and those who would dare to criticize him to stand silent or be
19. See, e.g., Munira Rangwala, The Evolution of Social Media over the Last 2 Decades,
YOURSTORY (MAY 12, 2017), https://yourstory.com/2017/05/evolution-of-social-media [https://
perma.cc/JE34-EDLZ] (discussing changes in social media over the past two decades).
20. Megan Twohey & Michael Barbaro, Two Women Say Donald Trump Touched Them
Inappropriately, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/politics/
donald-trump-women.html [https://perma.cc/B77W-DCBL].
21. Letter from Marc E. Kasowitz, Attorney for Donald Trump, to Dean Baquet, Exec.
Editor N.Y. Times (Oct. 12, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/DemandForRetraction.
PDF [https://perma.cc/KB4P-VSNK].
22. Letter from David E. McCraw, Vice President and Assistant Gen. Counsel N.Y. Times,
to Marc E. Kasowitz, Attorney for Donald Trump (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2016/10/13/us/politics/david-mccraw-trump-letter.html [https://perma.cc/5L52-
SH4W].
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punished, we welcome the opportunity to ... set him straight.”23
David McCraw was not only confident that the story was factually
accurate; he also knew that if Trump tried to sue for defamation, his
newspaper had the First Amendment in its corner.24
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court held that public
officials who bring defamation claims must demonstrate the de-
fendant published the challenged statements with “actual malice,”
or “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”25 The plaintiff in that case was Lester
Bruce (L.B.) Sullivan, one of the three city commissioners for the
city of Montgomery, Alabama who sued the New York Times for
defamation based on minor errors in a paid advertisement in the
paper by a group seeking to raise money to defend Martin Luther
King, Jr.26 The full-page advertisement, headlined “Heed Their
Rising Voices,” detailed the treatment of King and of civil rights
protestors throughout the South, including students at the Alabama
State College in Montgomery.27 The advertisement had several
errors, most of which were inconsequential.28 For example, it
reported that the police had “ring[ed]” the campus when, in fact,
they had surrounded the school on three sides; that King had been
arrested seven times when, in fact, it was four; and that state
officials had “padlocked” the college dining hall when the students
refused to reregister in protest, when they merely banned unregis-
tered students from eating there.29 Had the Times fact checked the
advertisement against its own reporting, it likely would have caught
these errors.30 Instead, its Advertising Acceptability Department
23. Id.
24. McCraw later said that he never expected his letter to go viral. The letter ended up
on the New York Times’s “most emailed list.” David McCraw, I Hardly Expected My Letter to
Donald Trump to Go Viral, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/
insider/i-hardly-expected-my-letter-to-donald-trump-to-go-viral.html [https://perma.cc/764R-
NRWD].
25. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80.
26. Id. at 256-57.
27. Id. at 256-58; see also Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25.
28. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258-59.
29. Id.; see also Heed Their Rising Voices, supra note 27, at 25.
30. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261.
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simply relied on the good reputation and uneventful prior dealings
with the advertisement’s sponsors.31
Although Sullivan did not claim he suffered any actual damages
from the errors in the advertisement, a Montgomery jury awarded
him $500,000 in presumed damages.32 And Sullivan’s case was just
one of many defamation cases that had been filed or threatened
against the Times (and other publishers).33 It is clear that southern
officials believed defamation actions were the way to keep the press
out of the South. Indeed, by 1964, the New York Times was facing
over six million dollars in potential libel damages, and one of its
leading reporters, Harrison E. Salisbury, was indicted on forty-two
counts of criminal libel as a result of his reporting in Birmingham,
Alabama.34 These civil and criminal libel claims threatened the
future existence of the publication; at the very least, they impacted
the paper’s coverage of the South.35
Until Sullivan, the Court had presumed—albeit in dicta
only—that the common law of defamation posed no constitutional
problems. In several prior decisions, the Court had listed libelous
statements as a category of speech that fell outside the scope of
First Amendment protection.36 The general assumption was that
libel law struck a balance between freedom of speech and protecting
reputational interests.37 Furthermore, the Court could have—and
31. Id. at 260-61.
32. Id. at 256, 260. “Presumed damages” are available under Alabama common law for
libel per se, which includes defamatory statements that bring a person into public contempt
arising out of conduct in office. A jury is permitted to “presume” the plaintiff suffered an
injury and award damages accordingly. See id. at 262-63, 267.
33. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at 231, 234.
34. See id. at 234; see also Elena Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 197, 200 (1996) (explaining that southern officials brought close to $300 million
in lawsuits against the press).
35. Because the Times initially thought its strongest defense to Sullivan’s libel case was
the lack of personal jurisdiction, it kept all of its reporters out of the state of Alabama for over
two years so that none of them could be served. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 14, at
235.
36. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 & n.6 (listing cases in which the Court has stated that
“the Constitution does not protect libelous publications”).
37. Arthur L. Berney, Libel and the First Amendment—A New Constitutional Privilege,
51 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1965) (noting that Professor Harry Kalven had examined the common
law of defamation and concluded that it, “perhaps somewhat haphazardly, has struck the
appropriate balance between the various values of free expression and the competing risks
of harm from it”).
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almost did—resolve the case on the much narrower ground that
Sullivan had failed to prove that the advertisement was “of and
concerning” him.38 The advertisement at issue did not mention
Sullivan at all; indeed, the evidence failed to demonstrate he played
any role in the police and state actions the advertisement
criticized.39
The Times argued to the Supreme Court that the First Amend-
ment barred all libel lawsuits brought by public officials based on
statements about their official conduct.40 Although Justices Black,
Douglas, and Goldberg embraced this view, this approach did not
command a majority of the Court.41 Despite equating defamation
actions by public officials with prosecutions under the Sedition Act,
the majority excluded calculated falsehoods.42 Specifically, the Court
held that defamatory statements are actionable if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the statements were made with “actual malice,”
which it defined as “knowledge that [the statement] was false or
[was made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”43
The Court explained that this protection for false speech was
necessary to create “breathing space” for public debate and avoid
“chilling” truthful speech.44 After all, the Court pointed out,
“erroneous [speech] is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing
space’ that they ‘need ... to survive.’”45 Rather than sending the case
back to the trial court for reconsideration based on the new actual
malice standard, as it normally would, the Court declared for
interests of judicial efficiency that the evidence submitted to the
jury could not meet said standard.46 The day after the Court
released its opinion, Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger
38. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 259; Berney, supra note 37, at 19.
39. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258-59.
40. See id. at 262-63.
41. See id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 276-77, 279-80 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 280.
44. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)); id. at 300
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 271-72 (majority opinion) (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433).
46. See id. at 284-86.
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declared, “The opinion of the Court makes freedom of the press more
secure than ever.”47
Sullivan is just one of a series of Supreme Court decisions
protecting anyone who criticizes public officials. The Court has
protected speech that causes public officials emotional distress,48 as
well as rhetorical hyperbole,49 opinion,50 and speech that is “sub-
stantially true.”51 The Court has also ruled in favor of the press on
a variety of procedural issues, which make it harder for plaintiffs to
prevail.52 The Court has also frequently repeated Sullivan’s
statement that the First Amendment reflects our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”53
But protections for defamatory speech are hardly absolute. The
actual malice standard is not the same as immunity; as a result,
publishers routinely find themselves forced to engage in expensive
litigation.54 Well-established newspapers such as the New York
Times, which has the resources to pay for lawyers as well as healthy
insurance coverage,55 can respond to litigation threats the way
David McCraw has responded to Donald Trump, but publishers and
speakers with fewer resources cannot. It is very difficult to win on
actual malice or truth at the motion to dismiss stage, which means
the litigation must go through expensive and time-consuming
discovery. Although the actual malice standard may deter some
plaintiffs from bringing defamation claims (or lawyers from taking
their cases), well-financed plaintiffs are often willing to take the risk
of losing a case and refuse to settle even when the outcome is
uncertain.
This also means that sometimes plaintiffs will win their defama-
tion claims, especially before a jury. Although courts of appeals
47. Editorial, Decision Welcomed by Times Publisher, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1964, at 23.
48. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
49. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
50. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
51. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1991).
52. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding plaintiffs
bear burden of proving falsity of allegedly defamatory statements).
53. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
54. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 499; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
55. See N.Y. TIMES CO., THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2019).
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frequently (but not always) overturn plaintiff victories,56 bringing an
appeal requires more expense and uncertainty. If the verdict is large
enough, the risk of an unsuccessful appeal might make settlement
more attractive. And as the Hulk Hogan/Gawker litigation demon-
strated, it may not be possible to bring an appeal, at least when the
publication cannot post the bond required to stay the execution of
judgment.57
Another problem with the Court’s defamation jurisprudence is
that the Court has refused to extend the actual malice standard to
all defamation cases, or even to all defamation cases involving
matters of public concern. For about ten years following Sullivan,
the Court extended the reach of that decision.58 Most significantly,
the Court held that the actual malice standard applied in cases
brought by public figures (and not just public officials).59 In Gertz,
the Court held that if a private plaintiff brings a defamation claim
based on statements involving matters of public concern, state law
could constitutionally permit recovery of actual damages on a
showing of mere negligence (punitive and presumed damages would
still require a showing of actual malice).60 This means that while the
New York Times can have great confidence it will escape liability for
defamation when it reports on sexual harassment allegations made
against President Trump, it must be significantly more careful when
publishing allegations against individuals who might not be public
officials or public figures. This is particularly important in cases
involving sexual harassment or assault claims, given the inherent
“he said/she said” nature of such accusations.61
56. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967).
57. See Peter Sterne, Gawker Media Files for Bankruptcy: Company Files for Chapter 11
to Protect Assets from Seizure by Hulk Hogan, POLITICO (June 10, 2016, 12:56 AM), https://
www.politico.com/media/story/2016/06/gawker-files-for-bankruptcy-to-protect-assets-from-
hogan-004593 [https://perma.cc/Y74Q-F5TE].
58. See James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of
Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 778, 796 (1975)
(discussing how this extension was halted with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.).
59. See Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 163-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 349 (1974).
61. See C. Amanda Martin, Stevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, Address at University of
North Carolina’s Festival of Legal Learning: The Law of Defamation: A Primer (Feb. 10,
2018).
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In Gertz, the Court focused far less on the importance of free
speech for democracy and more on the reputational harm plaintiffs
suffer.62 This emphasis stands in great contrast to Sullivan, where
concerns for reputational harm were largely absent.63 For whatever
reason—perhaps because Sullivan was not a sympathetic plaintiff,
or perhaps because the Justices were concerned about the press’s
ability to cover the civil rights movement—the Court’s primary and
virtually exclusive concern was to foster a robust public debate on
public issues.64 Indeed, Justice Brennan made clear that public of-
ficials were “men of fortitude,” and that the discussion of matters of
public concern must be robust and wide open.65 In Gertz, however,
the Court ended years of uncertainty about whether the actual mal-
ice standard would extend to all matters of public concern, or only
to cases involving public officials and public figures.66 Now, states
are free to impose liability for defamation on a showing of mere
negligence.67
As a result of the Gertz decision, a publisher’s risk of liability
turns significantly on the status of the plaintiff, rather than the
import of the statements.68 This is problematic from a theoretical
and jurisprudential perspective, but to those who rely on the
protections of the actual malice standard when making publication
decisions, it is more troubling as a practical matter. President
Trump easily qualifies as a public official, but the inquiry is far less
certain when it comes to other government employees,69 company
executives and corporations,70 and other high-profile individuals.71
In a short article in 2000, now Justice Kagan argued that despite
the deficiencies of Sullivan and its progeny, the protections for the
62. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 343-44.
63. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
64. See id. at 270.
65. Id. at 270, 273 (quoting Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
66. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 333-36.
67. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
68. See id.
69. To get a sense of the disagreement among the lower courts, see generally Danny R.
Veilleux, Annotation, Who Is “Public Official” for Purposes of Defamation Action, 44 AM. L.
REP. 5th 193 (1996).
70. See generally Matthew D. Bunker, Corporate Chaos: The Muddled Jurisprudence of
Corporate Public Figures, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2018).
71. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (holding Palm Beach
socialite was not a public figure for purposes of defamation action).
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press had the virtue of stability.72 It would be interesting to get her
views on this question now, almost two decades later. Certainly
Justice Thomas has made clear he would overrule Sullivan,73 and
it is possible that Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh would join him.
Not just conservatives might overrule Sullivan; Breyer aggressively
embraced case-by-case analysis in First Amendment cases and
might readily adopt that same approach in a defamation case.74 The
facts of Sullivan presented a wonderful vehicle for the Court to
“constitutionalize” defamation law. Sullivan was not really injured,
the false statements were not too far off from the truth, and the New
York Times was on the side of the civil rights movement.75 If, and
when, the Court reconsiders the scope of protections for defamatory
speech, the balance of equities might not tilt so heavily in their
favor.
II. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STATES AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SECRETS
Although it would be hard to dispute that Sullivan’s actual mal-
ice standard has provided the most significant and robust protec-
tion for the press, the Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
United States (Pentagon Papers) is no less significant for those
publishers who disseminate national security secrets and for the
public’s interest in learning what the government is doing in its
name.76 However, the Trump administration’s prosecution of Julian
Assange threatens to undo the state of “benign indeterminancy”
that has curbed both the government’s interest in prosecuting the
press as well as the press’s care in publishing national security
72. Elena Kagan, Libel and the First Amendment (Update), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1608, 1608 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
73. Adam Liptak, Justice Thomas Calls for Reconsideration of Landmark Libel Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/clarence-thomas-
first-amendment-libel.html [https://perma.cc/E3E9-H3S7].
74. See Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALA. L. REV. 403, 475-76 (2016).
75. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-60 (1963).
76. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that the government failed to meet the
burden for imposing a prior restraint).
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information.77 In addition, the decision offers no protection for the
sources who provide the secrets to the press.78
The Pentagon Papers case arose in a time of great cultural
upheaval in the United States. In addition to the civil rights
movement that began in the 1960s, the government had become
embroiled in an increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam.79 Daniel
Ellsberg, a RAND employee, was the source of the Pentagon
Papers.80 Determined to expose the truth of how and why the United
States was at war, Ellsberg copied this largely historical study and
passed it along to the New York Times, the Washington Post, and
other newspapers around the country.81 The New York Times was
the first to publish excerpts from the Pentagon Papers, and at first
President Nixon was not particularly concerned about them.82 On
that day, the news around the country focused on his daughter’s
White House wedding; in addition, Nixon saw the documents as
reflecting poorly on his predecessors rather than on himself.83 But
Nixon quickly came to regard the publication of these documents as
“treasonable” and authorized the Department of Justice to seek a
prior restraint enjoining the publication of additional portions of the
Pentagon Papers.84 The government claimed that the publication
posed a grave threat to the national security of the United States.85
The decisions from federal district courts in New York (against
the New York Times) and Washington, D.C. (the Washington Post)
made their way very quickly through the courts of appeals and then
the U.S. Supreme Court.86 Perhaps due to the speed with which the
77. Steve Vladeck, Trump Administration’s Assange Indictment Is a Referendum on the
Constitution, MSNBC THINK (May 24, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/
opinion/trump-administration-s-assange-indictment-referendum-constitution-ncna1010181
[https://perma.cc/T4ET-X3G5].
78. See id.
79. Jordan Moran, Nixon and the Pentagon Papers, UVA MILLER CTR., https://miller
center.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/first-domino-nixon-and-the-pentagon-papers
[https://perma.cc/TF22-A5UR].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Papers, 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 341, 355 (1993).
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Court heard the case and decided it,87 the Justices issued a very
brief per curiam opinion that made clear only that the government
bears a “heavy burden of showing justification” for a prior restraint
and that it had failed to meet that burden in this case.88
This decision was certainly a victory for the newspapers, but the
nine separate opinions that followed the per curiam opinion
revealed that the press’s victory was not complete.89 Three Justices
dissented and would have permitted a prior restraint;90 three others
made clear that they would regard subsequent criminal punishment
for publishing national security secrets differently from prior
restraints.91 Only Justices Black and Douglas would go so far as to
give the press complete immunity from criminal prosecution for
publishing national security secrets.92
It is also hardly clear what sort of analysis the Court would
undertake if the public value of the information were less obvious
and the harm to the nation’s national security interests were
greater. In the per curiam opinion, the Court simply concluded that
the government had not met its high burden for a prior restraint.93
The government had not made any sort of case for national security
harm resulting from publication94 (and subsequent commentators
disagree about whether they could have).95
The Pentagon Papers case is also arguably an aberration from the
Court’s generally deferential approach to the government’s asser-
tions of national security harm. In that case, the government failed
to make much of a case for harm at all.96 In other cases, it will not
87. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the rushed proceedings of the case).
88. See id. at 714 (per curiam).
89. See generally id.
90. Id. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 733 (White, J., concurring); id. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. Cf. id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring) (agreeing with a previous ruling by the Court to
invalidate criminal sanctions for attending Communist meetings). For a more complete
summary of the various opinions, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 279 (2008).
93. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
94. See id.; see also Sims, supra note 86, at 377-92 (describing deficiencies in the
government’s evidence that suggested there was no threat of harm to national security).
95. See Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National
Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1450 n.3 (2012) (noting the disagreement).
96. See Sims, supra note 86, at 377-92.
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be as difficult. The Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project provides the most recent example of this deference.97 There,
the Court relaxed its usually speech-protective jurisprudence to
reject a First Amendment challenge to the material support statute
as applied to U.S. citizens and organizations seeking to engage in
teaching and political advocacy supporting the lawful activities of
foreign terrorist organizations.98 The Court recognized that the
restriction amounted to a content-based speech restriction99 but
deferred to the government on the crucial question of whether
criminalizing the support of lawful activities of terrorist organiza-
tions was narrowly tailored.100
The Court’s 2001 decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper has given the
press some confidence that it would not face criminal prosecution for
publishing leaked information,101 although whether that confidence
is misplaced remains to be seen. In that case, two individuals
involved in a teachers union’s fight with a local school board sued a
radio station under wiretapping laws for airing a recording of their
illegally intercepted cell phone call.102 During this call, the plaintiffs
said that they might need “to go to [the school board members’]
homes” and “blow off their front porches.”103 The majority made
clear at the outset that the First Amendment analysis was the same
regardless of whether the defendants were members of the press.104
The majority also made clear that under the facts of the case before
it, the defendants had obtained the information “lawfully” even if
they knew or should have known that their source had obtained the
information unlawfully.105 The Bartnicki defendants had played no
97. See 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 27-28 (rejecting the government’s argument that the material support statute
generally restricts only conduct, not speech).
100. Id. at 33-34 (stating that the Executive branch’s conclusion “is entitled to deference”
because “[t]his litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and
foreign affairs”).
101. See 532 U.S. 514, 517-18 (2001).
102. See id. at 518-19.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 525 n.8 (“[W]e draw no distinction between the media respondents and
Yocum.”).
105. Id. at 528 (summarizing the question presented as “[w]here the punished publisher
of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from
a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication
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role in the interception and did nothing to encourage the anonymous
interceptor to give them the recording.106 Furthermore, the Court
determined (controversially) that the contents of the phone call were
“a matter of public concern”;107 Justice Breyer’s essential concurring
opinion went so far as to suggest that the plaintiffs lacked a
“legitimate” expectation of privacy in their calls because they were
discussing an act of violence.108
The Court could distinguish Bartnicki in a number of ways in a
future national security publication case. If the press played any
role in procuring the information, they would lack the clean hands
that the defendants in Bartnicki had.109 Bartnicki also, in part,
rested on the assumption that criminal punishment of a down-
stream publisher was not essential to deter interceptions because
the identity of the interceptors is typically known.110 With the rise
of hacking, this is becoming less the case across the board.111 In
national security cases, the government is increasingly relying on
technology to unmask leakers, but it surely cannot be said that
sources are readily identifiable.112 Bartnicki also downplayed the
harm caused by both the interception and the subsequent publica-
tion—the privacy interests of the public officials113—whereas in a
national security case, the harm might be more obvious, and the
public value less so.
of that information based on the defect in a chain?” (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d
463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)).
106. See id. at 519.
107. Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 539. Justice Breyer’s argument is controversial for two reasons. First, it
seems likely that the plaintiffs were engaged in some rhetorical hyperbole and did not
actually intend to engage in violent behavior. Second, it is not clear why an expectation of
privacy in a phone conversation depends on the content of that conversation.
109. See id. at 519 (majority opinion).
110. See id. at 530-32.
111. See Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace
Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
tracking-cyber-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/N569-QA9X].
112. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Once Reserved for Spies, Espionage Act Now Used Against Sus-
pected Leakers, NPR (June 28, 2017, 8:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/
06/28/534682231/once-reserved-for-spies-espionage-act-now-used-against-suspected-leakers
[https://perma.cc/6JCK-KCLK].
113. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (“In these cases, privacy concerns give way when
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”).
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Although both the Pentagon Papers case and Bartnicki leave open
the possibility that subsequent criminal punishment of the press
could comport with the First Amendment, the Department of
Justice has never brought such a prosecution (putting Julian
Assange to one side), notwithstanding extensive saber rattling and
name calling.114 Instead, as some journalists have explained, the
press and the government have continued to engage in an ongoing
“game of leaks.”115 In this game, the government attempts to keep
as much information secret as possible, and the press tries to get
access to this information and share it with the public.116 Perhaps
because the Pentagon Papers case left open the possibility of a
prosecution based on the publication of national security secrets,117
the press has been generally responsible in its publication
decisions.118
A number of factors have undermined this state of “benign in-
determinancy,”119 but perhaps the most important is the creation of
WikiLeaks by Julian Assange. Assange dramatically departs from
the mold of “responsible journalism.”120 Although initially it appears
he did not publish all the secret information he obtained and
instead engaged in some editorial discretion, in recent years, this
restraint seems to have disappeared.121 Indeed, the Department of
Justice, which has now indicted Assange on various charges,122
114. See Papandrea, supra note 92, at 234-35 (outlining executive branch criticism of the
New York Times’s decision to publish secret information about warrantless wiretapping).
115. I have discussed this “game of leaks” in more detail in my prior work. See, e.g., id. at
248-62.
116. See id. at 254.
117. Id. at 280. It is also possible that journalists are generally careful about their
publication decisions because they follow canons of journalistic ethics and are not interested
in publishing secrets just for the sake of publishing secrets.
118. See id. at 257-62.
119. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 10, at 936.
120. See Bellia, supra note 95, at 1471 (discussing the obligation of the press to withhold
harmful material).
121. See Gillian Branstetter, WikiLeaks Just Wants to Watch the World Burn, DAILY DOT
(May 4, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/via/wikileaks-sony-emails-leak-julian-assan
ge/ [https://perma.cc/K5UY-3GZJ].
122. See generally Superseding Indictment, United States v. Julian Paul Assange, No. 1:18-
cr-00111 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1165556/
download [https://perma.cc/6VME-NSHQ].
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claims that Assange is not a journalist and WikiLeaks is not the
press.123
Nevertheless, as a doctrinal matter, it will not be so easy to draw
a constitutional line between non-U.S. actors such as Assange and
publications such as the New York Times. Sullivan and the Penta-
gon Papers case did not rest on the Press Clause but instead on the
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.124 Indeed, the Court has
never relied on the Press Clause when ruling in favor of the insti-
tutional media.125 Although the Court has not definitively ruled out
giving separate meaning to the Press Clause,126 it seems unlikely it
ever will, given the difficulties of defining exactly who is the “press”
and entitled to protections under that provision.
To be sure, some of the allegations against Julian Assange reflect
behavior we are unlikely to see from the institutional media. For
example, one of the counts against him alleges that he assisted
Chelsea Manning in her efforts to break into the government
computer systems to obtain additional information;127 this is not the
sort of thing mainstream journalists typically do.128 In addition, it
is unclear whether the First Amendment even applies to Assange,
given that he is not a U.S. citizen and he acted primarily outside of
the United States.129
But most of the conduct alleged in the indictment is very similar
to things members of the institutional press do every day—actively
seeking and collecting classified information from their sources even
when they know their sources do not have authorized access, with
123. Elizabeth Goitein, The U.S. Says Julian Assange “Is No Journalist.” Here’s Why that
Shouldn’t Matter, WASH. POST (May 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/
05/25/us-says-julian-assange-is-no-journalist-heres-why-that-shouldnt-matter/ [https://perma.
cc/B2RH-6MDF].
124. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
125. See Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha:
Supreme Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375,
394 (2009).
126. See Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Putting the Shock Value in First Amendment
Jurisprudence: When Freedom for the Citizen-Journalist Watchdog Trumps the Right of
Informational Privacy on the Internet, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 339-40 (2011).
127. Superseding Indictment, supra note 122, at 6.
128. See Bellia, supra note 95, at 1471-72 (discussing responsible journalism).
129. Superseding Indictment, supra note 122, at 16-17, 19-35 (describing Assange’s
citizenship and where the alleged crimes were committed).
2020] PROTECTING THE ROLE OF THE PRESS 1177
the purposes of communicating that information to the public.130 For
example, the indictment alleges that Assange “took measures to
conceal Manning as the source of the classified records to Wiki-
Leaks, including by removing usernames from the disclosed infor-
mation and deleting chat logs between ASSANGE and Manning.”131
Journalists solicit information broadly and work actively with
sources who have information to share to aid in the transmission of
that information, such as by providing a secure portal for receiving
it.132 At least since Edward Snowden’s disclosure about National
Security Agency (NSA) spying, reporters have become very adept at
using encrypted messaging services such as Signal to communicate
with their sources.133 They also commonly redact documents in an
effort to conceal the identity of their sources.134
In sum, some of the institutional media’s relationship with their
sources is not easily distinguishable as a legal matter from Wiki-
Leaks’s and Assange’s relationship.135 Although anonymous sources
surely surprise journalists with national security information, such
as the anonymous sources in Bartnicki,136 it is very common for
journalists to have long-standing relationships with their sources.137
The mainstream press also encourages sources to come forward with
information about the government and provides secure methods of
130. See id. at 2-3 (outlining Assange’s use of WikiLeaks to obtain classified information).
131. See id. at 36.
132. See Bellia, supra note 95, at 1472-73 (comparing the facts of the Pentagon Papers case
to the WikiLeaks disclosures).
133. See Lauren Kirchner, Encryption, Security Basics for Journalists, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Sept. 17, 2013), https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/hacks_hackers_security_for_
jou.php [https://perma.cc/9YKE-8FDL] (summarizing data security lecture to over seventy
journalists in 2013). Encryption is becoming a common tool for journalists more generally. See,
e.g., Kate Krauss, Time for Journalists to Encrypt Everything, WIRED (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:30
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/time-journalists-encrypt-everything/ [https://perma.cc/
H7NW-2E8G].
134. See, e.g., Ted Han & Quinn Norton, Protecting Your Sources When Releasing Sensitive
Documents, SOURCE (June 7, 2017), https://source.opennews.org/articles/how-protect-your-
sources-when-releasing-sensitive-/ [https://perma.cc/WA4E-VJNT] (discussing how to redact
documents to protect sources).
135. See Bellia, supra note 95, at 1472-73.
136. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2000).
137. See Steve Mills, Defining the Delicate and Often Difficult Relationship Between
Reporters and Sources, PROPUBLICA ILL. (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/ask-propublica-illinois-reporters-and-sources-relationship [https://perma.cc/ESF9-L6
3J] (discussing maintaining relationships with sources).
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doing so.138 As a result, the press is left to rely on assurances by the
Department of Justice that it has no plans to prosecute the U.S.
institutional media.139
As we move forward, the likelihood that the Court will continue
to protect the press’s right to publish national security information
may depend on the facts of the case that come before it. The
Pentagon Papers case involved historical documents, rather than
contemporary facts or data, that contained information of extraordi-
narily high public concern (how the United States got into the war
in Vietnam and how the government lied to the American people
while doing so).140 The government was also unable to demonstrate
how the publication of this information would pose any sort of real
danger to the United States’s national security interests, aside from
embarrassment.141 In contrast, the WikiLeaks case involves infor-
mation of much less significant value and much greater harm to the
country’s national security interests. Rather than focus on all of the
war report and State Department cables WikiLeaks obtained from
Manning, the Superseding Indictment focuses narrowly on Wiki-
Leak’s disclosure of the names of human intelligence sources from
repressive regimes.142 The precise identities of intelligence sources
are generally not particularly newsworthy, while the potential that
the sources may face retaliation (bodily harm, imprisonment, etc.)
is very high. In addition, instead of having largely responsible and
widely respected defendants such as the New York Times143 and the
Washington Post,144 the case involves a publication that eschews
journalistic norms145 and engages in “information warfare.”146 All of
138. See Kirchner, supra note 133 (describing secure methods journalists use when
contacting sources).
139. Papandrea, supra note 92, at 262.
140. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971);
Bellia, supra note 95, at 1454-55 (citation omitted).
141. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
142. Superseding Indictment, supra note 122.
143. See id.; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
144. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
145. See Branstetter, supra note 121 (describing WikiLeaks’s lack of editorial discretion).
146. Eli Lake, Is Assange a Journalist? It Depends on What Year You Ask, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-17/is-julian-assange-a-
journalist-it-depends-what-year-you-ask [https://perma.cc/X2JA-3H5B] (noting that Wiki-
Leaks’s most recent activities involve “publishing the fruits of Russian hacking to influence
the 2016 presidential election” and technical information about the CIA’s hacking programs).
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these facts lay the groundwork for potentially devastating prece-
dent providing no (or very little) First Amendment protection for
the publication of national security information.
Another disconcerting development for the press is that the gov-
ernment has dramatically increased the number of leak prosecu-
tions.147 This trend began under President Obama148 and has
continued under President Trump.149 The Supreme Court has not
yet specifically addressed whether the national security leaks are
entitled to any First Amendment protection, but the related
precedent suggests that it is unlikely to do so.150 In Snepp v. United
States, the Court did not even hold oral argument in a case in which
a former government employee challenged a prior restraint
preventing him from publishing nonclassified information relating
to his former position without first going through prepublication
review.151 Although the Court recognized that the government could
not constitutionally prohibit him from publishing this information,
it concluded that it could require him to undergo prepublication
review “to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that
information detrimental to national interest is not published.”152
The Court also recognized the government’s interest in creating an
“appearance” that it could keep intelligence information secret.153
The Court went so far as to impose a constructive trust on the
profits the former employee earned from the publication of his book
even though the government had not even requested that relief.154
Snepp is not only inconsistent with the Court’s general First
Amendment jurisprudence—especially the Pentagon Papers case—
but it is also inconsistent with the Court’s other cases relating
147. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks
and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 451-52 (2014).
148. See id.
149. See Avi Asher-Schapiro, Leak Prosecutions Under Trump Chill National Security Beat,
COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Mar. 6, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://cpj.org/blog/2019/03/
leak-prosecutions-trump-national-security-beat.php [https://perma.cc/D2F6-TZLQ] (reporting
that the Department of Justice under President Trump had brought six prosecutions against
sources, a faster pace than leak prosecutions under President Obama).
150. Papandrea, supra note 147, at 512.
151. 444 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980) (per curiam).
152. Id. at 513 n.8.
153. Id. at 509 n.3.
154. Id. at 515-16.
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specifically to public employees.155 Even though the Court has scaled
back significantly on the First Amendment rights of government
employees in cases such as Garcetti v. Ceballos,156 it does not fit with
the Court’s continued holdings that employees have a right to en-
gage in speech relating to matters of public concern, at least when
the government’s interest in secrecy does not outweigh the em-
ployee’s interest in speaking.157 So far, the lower courts have not
embraced any arguments that leakers have First Amendment
rights.158 Furthermore, these cases tend to result in plea deals and
do not make their way up to the appellate courts, much less the U.S.
Supreme Court.159
The increase in leak prosecutions threatens the press in a number
of important ways. Most obviously, leak prosecutions deter sources
from coming forward with information.160 There can be no doubt
that without sources willing to engage in the unauthorized trans-
mission of information to the press we would not know very much
about what our government is doing in our name.161 With the
increased focus on prosecuting leakers comes more investigatory
resources spent on identifying them for prosecution.162 This can
involve highly invasive surveillance of possible sources, methods
that frequently involve tracking the communications and move-
ments of journalists.163 Isolated instances of this have already
155. But see Bellia, supra note 95, at 1512 & n.295 (citing Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509-10;
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the govern-
ment has successful nondisclosure agreements in a couple of cases)).
156. 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006).
157. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that a government employee’s
speech must involve a matter of public concern to receive First Amendment protection);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (restrictions on government employees’
speech require a “balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”).
158. See Papandrea, supra note 147, at 512.
159. See id. at 458.
160. Id. at 460.
161. See Papandrea, supra note 92, at 254-55.
162. See Selina MacLaren, How Do Leak Investigations Work?, REP. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM PRESS (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.rcfp.org/how-do-leak-investigations-work/ [https://
perma.cc/Z3QT-W6D7] (explaining the Department of Justice’s leak investigation process).
163. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 147, at 459-60 (citing examples of how the govern-
ment investigates potential leakers).
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happened.164 Reporters can also receive subpoenas in connection
with leak prosecutions and potentially face jail time if they are held
in contempt for refusing to identify their sources.165 And as the
Assange indictment reveals, the government is laying the founda-
tion to bring criminal charges against journalists for conspiring with
government employees and contractors to reveal information in
violation of the law.166
III. LACK OF NEWSGATHERING PROTECTIONS
Although the press had great victories in Sullivan and the
Pentagon Papers case, it has not always emerged from the Court
victorious. The Court has been particularly reluctant to embrace
constitutionally based newsgathering rights. Although the Court
has recognized a First Amendment right of access to some judicial
proceedings, it has not extended this right more broadly. This
means that, although the press has robust protections for the
distribution of information, its ability to obtain information is based
largely on statutes and customary norms. One reason the Court has
hesitated to recognize newsgathering rights is that it is unwilling to
base any such rights on the Press Clause. Instead, such rights must
extend to the public at large. This hesitancy is based in large part
upon the difficulties of defining “the press” or “journalists.” This
definitional problem is not going away any time soon. As a result,
the modern press finds its right to access government information
is fragile, and the court system will provide little recourse.
The Court has embraced the right of access to some judicial
proceedings in a line of cases beginning with Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia167 in 1980. In that case, the Court held that the First
164. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Leslie Kaufman, Phone Records of Journalists Seized by
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/phone-records-of-
journalists-of-the-associated-press-seized-by-us.html [https://perma.cc/AH5V-C9JQ] (reporting
that the government obtained personal and professional electronic communication records of
AP reporters without prior notice).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
reporter James Risen’s challenge to a subpoena seeking the identity of his source in
connection with Jeffrey Sterling prosecution).
166. See Papandrea, supra note 147, at 455-62 (explaining changes that could make leak
prosecutions more likely).
167. 448 U.S. 554 (1980).
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Amendment requires criminal trials to be presumptively open to the
public.168 In subsequent cases, the Court embraced a two-prong
inquiry for determining whether there is a presumptive First
Amendment right of access to government proceedings: (1) whether
history and tradition support open proceedings; and (2) whether
“considerations of experience and logic” would support open
proceedings.169 If a presumptive right of access attaches, then any
closure orders must satisfy strict scrutiny.170 The Court has
extended the right of access to preliminary hearings in criminal
cases171 and jury selection for criminal trials.172
While the right of access to judicial proceedings is relatively well
established,173 the Court has never embraced a right of access to
government information more generally. Indeed, prior to its decision
in Richmond Newspapers, the Court had rejected press arguments
for a right of access to prisons. Although the Court’s decisions in
part rested on the conclusion that the press was not entitled to a
greater right of access than the public at large, the sweeping
language of the opinions suggested that a majority of the Court
believed the First Amendment provided no right of access at all to
government information.174 This apparent wholesale rejection of a
First Amendment right of access in these cases led Justice Stevens
to proclaim in Richmond Newspapers that the decision was “a
watershed case” because “[u]ntil today the Court has accorded
virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or
ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of
newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection
whatsoever.”175 
168. Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., plurality); id. at 584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 599-
600 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Only Justice Rehnquist
dissented. See id. at 604-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
169. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II ), 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986)
(setting forth two-party test).
170. Id. at 9-10.
171. Id. at 10.
172. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise I ), 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984).
173. Of course, lower courts have not always concluded that the right of access attaches to
all judicial proceedings, but courts generally apply the framework to determine if there is such
a right and do not simply reject access claims out of hand. 
174. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on
Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 39-44 (discussing pre-Richmond Newspapers cases).
175. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 554, 582 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
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The Court has not extended the constitutional right of access it
recognized in the Richmond Newspaper line of cases outside of the
judicial context. Quite remarkably, after hearing several cases in
quick succession from 1980 to 1986—all of which involved access to
judicial proceedings of some sort—the Court has not addressed the
issue since then.
It does not seem likely that the Court would extend the right of
access outside of judicial proceedings even if it did decide to take
cases presenting the issue. The Court is well aware that right of
access claims are “theoretically endless.”176 The framework the
Court has established to limit the recognition of a right of access
currently depends upon a finding that there is a tradition of
openness.177 This will be extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate in
most circumstances and is more likely to extend to proceedings than
to documents.178
Furthermore, the Court is not likely to grant the press any special
right of access to government information.179 The Court has never
recognized the Press Clause as the basis for any constitutional right;
instead, the most important cases for the press—including Rich-
mond Newspapers—extend constitutional rights to the public at
large.180 Even before the Internet revolutionized and democratized
our information ecosystem, the Supreme Court struggled to
recognize press-specific rights due to the difficulty of defining the
“press” or “journalists.” In a case rejecting a constitutional reporter’s
privilege in the context of federal grand jury proceedings, the Court
cited the “practical and conceptual difficulties” inherent in such an
concurring).
176. Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
177. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II ), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
178. See Papandrea, supra note 174, at 204 (noting some lower courts have limited or
ignored the “history and tradition” inquiry to find a right of access to some administrative
proceedings).
179. Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People's Discretion: Ju-
dicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act,
66 ADMIN. L. REV.725, 728-29 (2014) (finding that disclosures under FOIA when the gov-
ernment has invoked the national security exemption have been exceedingly rare; article
measured period from September 2001 to 2014).
180. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“It has generally been held that the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally.”).
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undertaking.181 The first difficulty the Court cited is the difficulty of
“defin[ing] those categories of newsmen entitled to the privilege.”182
The Court explained that the freedom of the press is a “fundamental
personal right” that does not belong exclusively to journalists but
rather extends to “the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or
a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher
who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.”183 Now that
everyone can participate in the creation and dissemination of
information to the public, this definitional problem is multiplied
many times over.184 Notwithstanding the Branzburg v. Hayes de-
cision, some lower federal courts have recognized a constitutional or
common law privilege in some contexts, but the law varies dra-
matically circuit by circuit.185
As a result of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to recognize a
right of access to information outside of judicial proceedings, the
press’s protection for information gathering depend almost exclu-
sively on statutes and regulations, as well as custom and practice.
Although the courts play a role in making sure that these statutory
or customary rights of access are administered consistently with the
due process clause,186 the rights themselves are subject to change (or
to be completely eliminated) depending upon the political winds.187
For example, although an overwhelming majority of states recognize
a statutory reporters privilege,188 there is no federal shield law.
Instead, in many instances journalists must rely solely on the
judicially unenforceable Attorney General Guidelines restricting
181. Id. at 704. 
182. Id. 
183. Id.
184. For a more thorough discussion of these definitional problems, see Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 564-84
(2007).
185. For a general overview, see id. at 551-64. 
186. See, e.g., Karem v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 203, 216 (2019) (holding Playboy report-
er stripped of his White House press pass demonstrated a likelihood of success on his due
process claim).
187. See, e.g., Sherrill v Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that the
White House is not required to “open its doors to the press, conduct press conferences, or
operate press facilities”).
188. Memorandum from LibRA—Faculty Research Service, UNC Sch. of Law, to Mary-
Rose Papandrea, Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, UNC Sch. of
Law, Shield Laws—50 State Survey (Oct. 11, 2019) (on file with the author).
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press subpoenas.189 Similarly, although both the states and the
federal government have freedom of information laws, these laws
are full of loopholes and are subject to amendment. For example,
after a federal appellate court ruled in favor of the ACLU’s FOIA
claim for access to images of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody
abroad,190 Congress quickly acceded to President Obama’s request
to amend FOIA to prohibit their disclosure.191
As politicians increasingly turn to social media to communicate
with the public, they are emboldened to restrict press access
because they no longer “need” the press the way that they used to.
Allowing public officials to control the flow of information to the
public is potentially very dangerous for the future of our democracy,
but it is hardly clear that the Supreme Court would be willing to
interfere with this state of affairs.
CONCLUSION
At a time when the President attacks “the lamestream media”192
at every opportunity, the role of the courts to protect the Fourth
Estate is more important than ever. Historically, the Supreme Court
has served this function at these times, as demonstrated in its
landmark decisions in Sullivan193 and the Pentagon Papers case.194
Over fifty years later, Sullivan continues to provide some important
constitutional protection from state defamation claims.195 The
189. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2015) (barring subpoenas to journalists unless information is
“essential” and officials have balanced the public’s interest in “[p]rotecting national security,
ensuring public safety, promoting effective law enforcement and the fair administration of
justice, and safeguarding the essential role of the free press in fostering government
accountability and an open society”).
190. ACLU v. DOD, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded by DOD v. ACLU,
130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
191. See The Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 565,
123 Stat. 2184. Defense Secretary Robert Gates invoked the exception, and the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the appellate decision. Bill Mears, Pentagon Bars Release of Pho-
tos Allegedly Showing Detainee Abuse, CNN (Nov. 15, 2009, 11:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2009/US/11/15/scotus.detainee.photos/index.html [https://www.perma.cc/6XX5-E8GQ].
192. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2019, 12:08 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1192307862204108800?lang=en [https://perma.cc/RC7C-
S72D].
193. See supra Part I.
194. See supra Part II.
195. See supra Part I.
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Pentagon Papers decision similarly created a culture of “benign
indeterminancy” that fosters press and executive branch coopera-
tion.196
Yet even these decisions do not provide the press with all of the
protection it might need in times of crisis. By embracing an “actual
malice” standard in public official/public figure defamation actions,
the Court has left the press exposed to expensive and time-consum-
ing litigation even in cases that ultimately proven meritless.
Furthermore, the Court has given publishers even less protection
when speaking about matters of public concern. These gaps in the
Sullivan framework are particularly troubling now that the press
generally has fewer resources to engage in protracted litigation. The
Pentagon Papers case likewise leaves the press exposed to the
possibility of criminal prosecution for the collection and publication
of national security information. The Julian Assange prosecution,
which targets an unsympathetic non-American operating outside of
the usual journalistic norms, threatens to create precedent that
could be damaging for all journalists. Finally, the Court’s failure to
recognize a constitutional right of access to government information
outside of criminal judicial proceedings means that the press has no
right to gather information necessary for an informed public debate.
Instead, the right of access to information largely rests in the
political process, and the judiciary’s role is limited in making sure
that the government follows its own rules, and that it does so
consistently with due process. 
196. See supra Part II.
